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Abstract 
California is implementing the most comprehensive global warming 
regulatory program in the United States.  A key part of this program is its 
cap-and-trade system.  Integral to the cap-and-trade requirements are 
provisions for offsets, whereby companies, to meet their caps, can purchase 
credits from certain unregulated entities whose activities are deemed to 
have resulted in real and additional emission reductions.  California has 
attempted to avoid the Kyoto Protocol’s project-by-project lengthy and 
problematic review of offsets with a performance standard approach for 
domestic offsets and a sector approach for international offsets.  Offsets, 
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even if done right, raise serious environmental justice questions as to who 
will benefit and who will be harmed as offsets are granted.  California’s 
approach, however, also raises questions about how real these offsets will 
be, which has already lead to litigation.  International offsets are even more 
troublesome.  California needs to reconsider its approach and further limit 
the availability of these offsets if the program is to have integrity, achieve its 
goals and avoid environmental justice concerns. 
I. Introduction
California is implementing the most comprehensive global warming
regulatory regime in the United States, the California Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006, commonly known by its bill name, AB 32.1  The 
program’s short-term goal is to return California’s greenhouse gas emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2020. 
A noteworthy and key part of this regime is its precedent setting cap-
and-trade system.2  Like most carbon cap-and-trade systems, California 
provides for the creation of offsets by third parties that can be sold to 
capped facilities to use in lieu of required emission reductions or expensive 
allowances obtained at auction from the government or by purchase from 
other capped sources.  If those offsets are real, they can enhance regulation 
by encouraging emission reductions from unregulated activities and reduce 
costs to regulated businesses.  If they are unreal, they can undermine the 
entire program by blocking actual emission reductions. 
California has a two-prong approach to offsets.  Domestically, 
California allows offsets category by category using performance standards 
to determine if offsets are real.  Internationally, California relies upon other 
countries to execute a geographical sector approach if California determines 
these other countries have sufficient systems in place to assure the offsets 
are reliable.   
The biggest danger to cap-and-trade programs has been the ease with 
which the rules can be gamed.  The original cap is set too high, delaying 
emission reductions for years.  Or a glut of tradable permits, sometimes 
called credits or allowances, produce the appearance of compliance without 
any actual reductions.  Or available phantom offsets cause the price of 
carbon to plummet, defeating the fundamental goal of cap-and-trade to put 
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (Deering 2013).
2. The author uses the phrase “cap-and-trade” because the ARB describes its
program as cap-and-trade.  As discussed below, the ARB’s trading program 
incorporates offsets, making it technically  a “hybrid” cap-and-offset program.  See 
DAVID M. DRIESEN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGRAMATIC APPROACH, 310 
2nd Edition, 2011. 
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a price on carbon and promote innovation and produce real pollution 
reductions.   
California believes it has avoided these problems.  However, the 
California offset game has just officially begun with cap-and-trade effective 
January 1, 2012.  One lawsuit has already been filed challenging the legality 
of the offset program, and its ultimate fate now rests with a California Court 
of Appeal.  Meanwhile, California is establishing linkages with provinces of 
other countries, beginning with Quebec, extending its offset program 
internationally.  Whether the rules are fair and effective is very much in play. 
II. California’s Global Warming Solutions Act
California’s cap-and-trade program is actually a small part of a larger
regulatory initiative to address climate change.  California’s AB 32 program 
is a collection of policies with one single goal, the reduction of California’s 
emissions to its 1990 levels of emissions.3  The lead agency is the California 
Air Resources Board (“ARB”).4  The ARB estimated that achieving emission 
reductions to 1990 levels would mean a 30% reduction from what would 
have been business as usual in 2020, a 15% reduction from 2008 levels.5 
However, achieving 1990 levels does not necessarily mean that the 
actual emissions in California alone will be at 1990 levels in 2020.  Emission 
reductions outside of California will count towards the 1990 goal if they 
meet the program’s offset requirements that are more fully discussed below. 
Having at least this 1990-related target, the California initiative has 
encompassed a variety of programs.  These programs created by statute 
were gathered into a “Scoping Plan”, adopted in late 2008, to assure the 
meeting of the emissions limit in a manner that achieves “the maximum 
technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions.”6  The Legislature 
provided ARB a wide berth of discretion in picking emissions reduction 
tools: 
The plan shall identify and make recommendations on direct 
emission reduction measures, alternative compliance 
mechanisms, market-based compliance mechanisms, and 
potential monetary and nonmonetary incentives for sources and 
categories of sources that the state board finds are necessary or 
desirable to facilitate the achievement of the maximum feasible 
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (Deering 2013).
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38510 (Deering 2013).
5. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD., CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN ES-1 (2008)
[hereinafter SCOPING PLAN], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/docum 
ent/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf. 
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561 (Deering 2013).
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and cost-effective reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by 
2020.7
ARB then had full authority to “adopt rules and regulations in an open 
public process to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and cost-
effective greenhouse gas emission reductions from sources or categories of 
sources, subject to the criteria and schedules set forth in this part.”8  The 
regulations were to be adopted by January 1, 2011, for implementation 
beginning January 1, 2012.9 
ARB’s authority was constrained by nine policy considerations “to the 
extent feasible.”10  These considerations in general implemented a number 
of the legislature’s concerns that the program: (a) be consistent with 
environmental justice (e.g., “do not disproportionately impact low-income 
communities”11); (b) minimize costs and maximize benefits (e.g., “consider 
cost-effectiveness”12); and (c) be effective in achieving greenhouse gas 
reductions (e.g., “minimize leakage”13). 
In the 2008 Scoping Plan, the largest single category of reductions was 
originally to come solely from the cap-and trade program, around 34.4 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2E), almost 20% of 
the 174 MMTCO2E sought to reach 1990 levels.
14  That figure has more 
recently been adjusted to about 18 MMTCO2E, about 10% of the needed 
reductions.15 
As a result, the largest reductions now are from automobile 
requirements, 31.7 MMTCO2E, about 18% of the needed reductions.  AB 
42823 (2002) required the so-called Pavley standard,16 which the Obama 
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(b) (Deering 2013).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560 (Deering 2013).
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(a) (Deering 2013).  Cap-and-trade
technically started in 2012 but the compliance obligations actually commenced in 
2013.  CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD., CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 
IMPLEMENTATION FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (May 24, 2013), available at http://www. 
arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/implementation/faq_5_24_2013.pdf. 
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b) (Deering 2013).
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (Deering 2013).
12. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(5) (Deering 2013).
13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(8) (Deering 2013).
14. SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 17, Table 2.
15. See CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD., FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE AB 32 SCOPING 
PLAN FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT 12, TABLE 1.2-3 (2011), available at http://www. 
arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/final_supplement_to_sp_fed.pdf. 
16. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5 (Deering 2013).
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administration affirmed upon taking office,17 contain some trading elements, 
but is primarily a command and control program intended to reduce 
through greenhouse gases, engine design, and automobile pollution 
controls. 
The next largest category is energy efficiency measures, at 26.3 
MMTCO2E.  Appliance efficiency, solar water heating and cogeneration are 
included in this category.  It represents around 15% of the goal.   
The third largest category is the Renewable Portfolio Standard, 
accounting for 21.3 MMTCO2E.  This program now requires investor owned 
utilities to derive 33% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020.18  
Already, California’s utilities have reached or will soon reach 20%.19  This 
represents about 12% of the goal. 
The fourth category is “High Global Warming Potential Gas Measures.” 
Directed at refrigerant gases, these represent 20.2 MMTCO2E, over 11% of 
the emission reductions necessary to reach 1990 levels.   
Now fifth are the additional reductions required for capped industries 
that must come through the cap-and-trade program.  While the Scoping Plan 
estimated that 85% of emission sources were covered by the cap, as 
indicated above only 10% of the emission reductions were anticipated to 
come from the cap-and-trade mechanism alone. 
The sixth largest category is the low carbon fuel standard.  This 
standard again contains some trading elements, but is primarily a command 
and control program.  Anticipated to produce 15 MMTCO2E of reduction, it 
represents almost 9% of the program. 
Thus, cap-and-trade is projected as a relatively small part of what 
remains primarily a command and control program.  Yet it has become the 
high-profile element of the program, and its most controversial one.  There 
are many reasons for the focus on cap-and-trade, and these reasons make it 
important that the program work correctly for the entire regulatory initiative 
to succeed. 
First, California’s program represents the United States’ most 
comprehensive20 venture into cap-and-trade for greenhouse gases and 
therefore could be the model for future regulation.  Prior to this program, 
17. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 74 Fed.
Reg. 129, 32744 (2009). 
18. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740 (Deering 2013).
19. See CALIFORNIA PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD
QUARTERLY REPORT 3RD AND 4TH QUARTER 2012 3 (2013), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
NR/rdonlyres/4F902F57-78BA-4A5F-BDFA-C9CAF48A2500/0/2012_Q3_Q4RPSReportFI 
NAL.pdf. 
20. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) of Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic States is the first market-based greenhouse gas regulatory program but is 
limited to the power industry.  See http://www.rggi.org (last visited on Oct. 9, 2013).  
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the United States’ record was one of playing with the concept and then 
backing off.  First there were the negotiations over the 1998 Kyoto Protocol 
that set forth the international carbon control and trading regime,21 where 
the United States advocated for cap-and-trade and then refused to sign the 
treaty.22  Later, in 2009, the House of Representatives, while still in 
Democratic hands during the first years of the Obama administration, 
passed the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill only to watch it die in the 
Senate.23 
Now California is implementing its program.  As stated by an 
economist with the Environmental Defense Fund, the organization that 
coined the phrase “cap-and-trade”24: 
California’s law is one of the largest and boldest efforts to limit 
emissions on the planet.  Until now, in the U.S. a carbon law has 
been hypothetical, theoretical.  California has an opportunity to 
show that this works in practice.  It can work as a lab for the rest 
of the country.25 
Secondly, cap-and-trade has become an ideological target and rallying 
cry.  Cap-and-trade, as eventually implemented in the federal Acid Rain 
21. See Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
22. See CHRIS WOLD, MELISSA POWERS & DAVID HUNTERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
LAW 197-200, 205 (Question 3) (2009). 
23. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)
(passed by the House July 7, 2009); See Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax With Reinvestment 
Trumps Cap-And-Trade, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 580, 586 (Spring 2013). 
24. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has been credited with actually
coining the term “Cap-And-Trade.”  See Elizabeth Dickinson, Capping It Off, How a 
Concept Became an Environmental Policy Catchphrase, FOREIGN POL’Y (March/April 2010), 
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/capping_it_off.  The 
intellectual roots of trading can actually be traced back to Thomas Crocker, a Ph.D. 
candidate at the time who was inspired by a paper by R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and early efforts by EPA staffers exploring market 
incentives and eventually the incorporation of offsets into the Clean Air Act.  Id.; 
Andrews Restuccia, Newly Released Paper Details Origins of Cap-and-Trade, WASHINGTON 
INDEP. (Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://washingtonindependent.com/102119/ 
inventor-of-cap-and-trade-thinks-its-the-wrong-approach-to-climate-change. 
25. Coral Davenport, California’s New Cap-and-Trade Law: A Model for the Country?,
NAT’L J. (May 30, 2013) (quoting Nathaniel Keohane), available at http://www.nationaljo 
urnal.com/magazine/california-s-new-cap-and-trade-law-a-model-for-the-country-0121213. 
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Program,26 originated with the mainstream Environmental Defense Fund 
collaborating with a Republican administration.27 It has since become 
identified with the carbon tax as it indirectly prices carbon based upon the 
cost of allowances, and it is still a Washington imposition of pollution 
controls in a manner that triggers Tea Party outrage.28  At the same time, 
environmental justice activists see cap-and-trade as an extension of the pay 
to pollute principle with an added twist that those suffering will be 
concentrated in minority or low-income communities.29  This politicization 
affects California’s program, because if indeed its cap-and-trade program 
amounts to merely a carbon tax, with little trading and innovation among 
capped industries, or its gains come at the expense of low-income 
communities or communities of color, it could discredit the program for 
years to come. 
The third reason the program is important is its practical relationship 
to the rest of California’s regulatory regime.  Emission reductions from the 
“capped” industries are expected to achieve more than two-thirds of the 
reductions, 146.7 MMTCO2E.  While most of these reductions are anticipated 
from other measures as discussed above, if these measures fail to be fully or 
partially implemented, cap-and-trade becomes an important backstop that 
complements these other measures.30  Given the attack on the low carbon 
fuel standard under the commerce clause in state and federal courts, that 
backstop is important.31 
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2012).
27. Richard Conniff, The Political History of Cap and Trade, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(August 2009), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Presence-
of-Mind-Blue-Sky-Thinking.html?c=y&story=fullstory. 
28. See Evan Lehmann, Ohio Conservatives See Climate Change as ‘Another Scam’,
CLIMATEWIRE (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059941567. 
29. Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn & Shipra
Bansal, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air 
Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 235 (1999) (“Pollution trading in Los 
Angeles has led to concentrated toxic air emission hot-spots that have shackled low-
income and minority communities with the region’s air pollution.”). 
30. SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 31 (“By setting a limit on the quantity of
greenhouse gases emitted, a well-designed cap-and-trade program will complement 
other measures for entities within covered sectors.”). 
31. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 2013 WL 5227091 (9th Cir.
2013); POET, LLC  v. California Air Resources Board, 2013 WL 4040057 (Cal.App. 5 
Dist.).  The auction mechanism is also under legal attack.  See Verified Petition for 
Writ of Mandate, Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. Cal. Air Res. Bd. et al., (Super. Ct. 
Sacramento Cnty. Nov. 13, 2012), available at http://www.calchamber.com/Government 
Relations/Documents/SIGNED_Petition_11-13-12.pdf.  Related subsequent litigation 
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Full-blown cap-and-trade, as originally suggested by Ackerman and 
Stewart in “Reforming Environmental Law,”32 was seen as a program 
involving “tradable permits.”  As Tyler McNish points out, “The early cap-
and-trade programs did not have offset programs comparable to those used 
by carbon cap-and-trade programs . . . .”33  Indeed, the most successful cap-
and-trade program, the federal Acid Rain program, “did not use offsets.”34   
The idea was that the “government establishes a cap on the total 
emissions of a certain pollutant from a set of regulated sources over a fixed 
compliance period.”35  Pollution sources would have a declining cap on their 
emissions, but were free to meet that cap by reducing their emissions in any 
manner they wished, or to buy tradable permits to pollute (now known as 
credits or allowances) from similarly capped sources who had reduced their 
emissions below their cap.  As Ackerman and Stewart put it: 
Our basic reform would respond to these deficiencies by allowing 
polluters to buy and sell each other’s permits—thereby creating 
a powerful financial incentive for those who can clean up most 
cheaply to sell their permits to those whose treatment costs are 
highest.36  
is discussed by Professor Ann Carlson in California Sued Again Over Cap-and-Trade 
Program, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 16, 2013), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2013/04/16/ 
california-sued-again-over-cap-and-trade-program. 
32. Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV 1333 (1985).  David Dreisen draws an intellectual history of the “tradable 
permits” idea back to an essay by Canadian economist J. H. Dales, POLLUTION 
PROPERTY AND PRICES:  AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND ECONOMICS (1968), in Capping 
Carbon, 40 LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL. L. JOURNAL 1, 11 n.47 (2010), available at 
http://www.lclark.edu/live/ 
files/3590-401driesen.html. 
33. Tyler McNish, Carbon Offsets Are a Bridge Too Far in the Tradable Property Rights
Revolution, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 398 (2012).  See David Dreisen, supra note 32, at 
3 n.3 (“A pure cap-and-trade program only allows facilities with capped emissions to 
purchase credits from other facilities subject to caps.”).   
34. THE MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR
CALIFORNIA 98 (2009) [hereinafter MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE], available at http://www. 
energy.ca.gov/2007publications/ARB-1000-2007-007/ARB-1000-2007-007.PDF. 
35. Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-And-Trade: Moving
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 398 (2009). 
36. Ackerman and Stewart, supra note 32, at 1341.
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In this manner, those who could reduce most efficiently would be 
rewarded for their innovation, and those who would find it most expensive 
could avoid that expense by buying cheaper credits.  The result would be a 
flexible program that would reduce the marginal costs of emissions 
reduction to the lowest possible.37  The argument by cap-and-trade 
adherents is that this approach would be far superior to a command and 
control program where emission reductions were prescribed by regulators, 
imposed generally across the regulated community, and defined by concepts 
such as a one size fits all best available control technology which might 
neither be the best nor available, at least cost effectively. 
Cap-and-trade seemed to be a revolutionary idea, but its execution has 
been haphazard.  Defining the initial cap turned out to be a hotly contested 
and easily flawed process.  If a cap was initially set too high, then reductions 
were easily achieved but were meaningless as no real additional reductions 
beyond what would have happened anyway would occur for years, such as 
with the federal Acid Rain Program.38  When the cap eventually declines to a 
level that requires real reductions, companies would be unprepared, and 
would ask for exceptions or be opted out of the program.  This appears to 
have happened with the Southern California RECLAIM cap-and-trade 
program.39   
If the cap were not adjusted to undermine its effectiveness, companies 
would lobby for free emission credits or allowances.  Under the Acid Rain 
program, Congress handed out allowances for early reductions, the use of 
certain technologies and other measures.40  Under Kyoto, allowances were in 
effect given to Eastern European countries by adjusting their base line up to 
reflect what they might have produced if not under harsh Soviet control. 
There were justifications offered in each case.  For example, for certain Acid 
Rain capped facilities, it was to make up for early adoption of controls.  In 
the case of Eastern Europe, the intent was not to punish the countries for 
having an abnormal low level of emissions due to the constraint of the 
Soviet system.41  But the end result was that in its early years a cap could be 
rendered meaningless.  The same kind of cap problems aggravated by the 
recent recession undermined the European carbon market causing a glut in 
tradable permits.42 
37. See id. at 1342.
38. See McAllister, supra note 35, at 413.
39. McAllister, supra note 35, at 403-406.
40. See id. at 399-400.
41. See CHRIS WOLD ET AL., supra note 22, at 232.
42. Ewa Krukowska, Carbon Market Glut-Fix Wins Backing in EU Parliament,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, (July 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-03/carbon-
market-glut-fix-plan-wins-backing-in-european-parliament.html. 
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California believes it has learned its lessons from these other 
programs.  This article focuses on offsets, not the California cap, so it will 
assume California’s cap has been properly done.  However, given how 
treacherous cap setting has been, even in California with the RECLAIM 
program, it is all the more reason for assuring that the offset program is 
credible. 
In California, the ARB established a cap reducing emissions from the 
596 MMTCO2E business-as-usual scenario to 422 MMTCO2E in 2020.  It 
covers a broad array of state pollution sources: manufacturers producing 
products such as cement, glass, paper, steel, refined petroleum43; electricity 
generators or importers44; and natural gas, fuel and carbon dioxide 
suppliers.45 
These capped sources have an “Allowance Budget” that corresponds to 
the declining cap necessary to meet 1990 emission limits.46  This budget is 
being implemented in two phases, with the first compliance period affecting 
electricity deliverers, and then the rest of the capped facilities in the second 
compliance period.47  The first phase begins in 2012 and the second phase 
begins in 2015.48  Each facility has to provide an allowance, which is equal to 
one MCO2E, for each ton of its emissions.
49  ARB distributes allowances for 
free for each compliance period in a complicated schedule that attempts to 
initially cover 90% of prior emissions, subject to various rules that may 
adjust the percentage.50  For example, various industries facing a high threat 
of leakage that would likely transfer their pollution out of state to avoid 
penalties receive a 100% of their assigned allowances for free through 2020.51  
Others receive a declining number of allowances, having to make up the rest 
through purchasing allowances at a state run auction, from third parties or 
through offsets.52  An auction is held quarterly for the remaining 10% of the 
capped emissions to create a minimum price for carbon releases, with a 
43. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811(a) (2013).
44. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811(b) (2013).
45. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811(c)-(g) (2013).
46. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95841 (2013).
47. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95851 (2013).
48. See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 31.
49. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(8) (2013).
50. See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 34.
51. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95870, Table 8-1 (2013) (included are facilities
such as petroleum extraction, steel mills and paper mills). 
52. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95870, Table 8-1 (2013).
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minimum bid of $10.71 per allowance.  The first few auctions have been sold 
out between the minimum price and up to $14 per allowance.53 
As cap-and-trade developed, a new concept was grafted on to the 
original trading idea, creating a hybrid approach.  Borrowing from the Clean 
Air Act’s new source review offset program,54 and EPA’s use of netting or 
bubbles,55 it was recognized that there might be cheaper emission reduction 
measures at facilities or activities that are not covered directly by the 
program and subject to a cap and whose emission reduction could be 
turned into a commodity called an offset.  The Kyoto Protocol, discussed 
below, features an offset program, as does the European response to Kyoto, 
the European Union Emission Trading System:56 
Offsets play a key role in reducing the overall cost of GHG 
regulations and achieving reductions in uncapped sectors.  The 
cost containment aspects work in two ways.  First, offsets 
projects, especially those involving land use activities, are often 
less expensive to implement than emissions reductions by 
regulated entities.  Second, in a market-based program with a 
strict cap on emissions, offset credits from uncapped sectors 
create an option for increasing the supply of compliance 
instruments.57  
As will be discussed below in reference to the Kyoto Protocol version 
of cap-and-trade and the California program, forestry is the most prominent 
of these activities, but other examples like destruction of refrigerants that 
are greenhouse gases and control of methane from various activities, but 
especially in agriculture, are not allowed.  If these activities were credited for 
their emission reductions, and were cheaper than measures resulting in 
reductions in the capped sector, then these credits could be sold to capped 
sources that could then more easily and more cheaply meet their caps.  This 
would minimize emissions in the cheapest fashion, expand the reach of the 
program into areas not subject to regulation, and drive innovation in new 
areas.   
53. See AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES 
BOARD ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS QUARTERLY AUCTION RESULTS SUMMARY STATISTICS (2012), 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm. 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a), (c) (2012).
55. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864 n.37 (1984). 
56. See MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 34, at 103.
57. David M. Cooley, Jonas J. Monast, Carbon Offsets and Environmental Impacts:
NEPA, The Endangered Species Act, and Federal Climate Policy, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 
378-79 (Winter 2011).
   
West  Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2014 
120 
At least that was the idea.  The practice has been more challenging 
than expected as explained below.  
III. The Kyoto Offset Problem
The world’s nations that began to work together to develop a global
regime to address climate change seized upon market mechanisms, 
principally cap-and-trade, as its core strategy.  At first, in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, effective in 1994,58 the 
signatories including the United States only sketched the broad outlines of 
what a regime should be.  The program among other goals should: 
(1) Achieve a “level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system”;59
(2) Over a time period slow enough “to enable economic development
to proceed in a sustainable manner”;60
(3) Be “precautionary” yet “cost effective so as to ensure global benefits
at the lowest possible cost “;61
(4) “[W]ith the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990
levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide”;62
(5) The developed countries “shall take all practicable steps to
promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or
access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to
other Parties, particularly developing country Parties.”63
All of these goals speak to the promise of cap-and-trade.  Cap-and-
trade starts with a cap that declines to a level agreed upon in advance.  Yet 
it does so over a period of time, allowing companies flexibility to choose 
between innovation or buying credits.  The goal can be a health-based 
standard that is precautionary (or in California’s case, an interim step in 
greenhouse gas reduction), yet with trading that allows reductions at the 
marginally cheapest cost.  Interim steps in the cap can be identified, such as 
the 1990 level of emissions.  And for our discussion, offsets can provide a 
vehicle where developed countries can reduce emissions at a cheaper cost 
58. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
convkp/conveng.pdf. 
59. Id. at art. 2.
60. Id.
61. Id. at art. 3.
62. Id. at art. 4.2(b).
63. Id. at art. 4.5.
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in developing countries, thus encouraging investment and the transfer of 
technology. 
When the world’s nations gathered in Kyoto, Japan, to finalize a 
protocol implementing the goals of the Framework Convention, the United 
States was able to promote cap-and-trade, pointing to its success in 
addressing Acid Rain in the United States, and its consistency with the 
Framework Convention.64  As doubts were overcome, and with many nations 
as it turned out fruitlessly believing cap-and-trade would be essential for 
United States participation, the Kyoto Protocol eventually included cap-and-
trade as its core idea with a cap that would be the equivalent of an average 
5% below 1990 levels for each nation by 2012.65   
Linked to this cap-and-trade program would be the idea of offsets.  The 
Kyoto Protocol established its Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).66  
Intended for developing countries, the CDM provides “certified emission 
reductions” on a project-by-project basis that developed countries could use 
to demonstrate compliance with their caps. 
The CDM has suffered serious problems.  Determining whether 
emissions have actually increased is easy if you have continuous and 
automatic emissions monitoring that can be verified.  In a developing 
country where one relies upon records that may not exist, and testing 
technology that may be inadequate or fraudulent, it can be difficult if not 
impossible.  Assuring that any real emission reductions will continue due to 
the force of law is also difficult if the country’s legal regime is weak or 
vulnerable to corruption, as in Libya, Mali, or Mexico. 
Beyond these challenges is the issue of what would have happened 
anyway.  A developing country is so-named because it is economically 
underdeveloped and is hopefully making economic and social progress.  In 
that climate, how does one distinguish between an emission reduction that 
would have happened anyway and one that is happening only or in part 
because of the encouragement of the offset program and the potential to 
sell a credit for a profit?   
The CDM Executive Board and forty-one U.N.-chartered Designated 
Operational Entities (DOEs), governmental, nonprofit, or private consultants 
who review offset applications, oversaw Kyoto countries attempting to 
address these issues on a project-by-project approach.67  The results have 
been mixed and heavily criticized for awarding credits for projects that 
64. See CHRIS WOLD ET AL., supra note 22.
65. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 3 and 17.
66. Id. at art. 12.3.
67. Tyler McNish, Carbon Offsets Are A Bridge Too Far In The Tradable Property Rights
Revolution, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 403 (2012). 
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would have happened anyway.68  Perhaps to overcome these criticisms, the 
CDM engages in what project proponents consider to be a too burdensome 
review, greatly increasing costs for both proponent and the reviewing 
agency.69  A recent review of CDM cost studies by Tyler McNish in the 
Harvard Law Review found estimates that transition costs would drain from 
a CDM investment anywhere from €0.04 to €16 per TCO2,
70 but he argues that
the best estimate of all relevant costs is 36% is drained from a CDM 
investment.71   
In the first case to litigate the legality of California’s offset program, 
the numbers clearly disturbed the ARB and the Judge.  In that case, Citizens 
Climate Lobby v. California Air Resources Board,72 the Judge noted studies 
suggesting the “initiation of a project costs between $80,000 and $230,000 
with an annual cost of $20,000 to $35,000 in the first year and $15,000 to 
$25,000 in subsequent years.”73   
When it was done well, the transition costs of assuring a project would 
accomplish its goals were quite significant, providing a strong disincentive 
to developing an offset.  However, when the review was not done well, even 
more troubling is whether the offsets are “additional,” that is, would they 
have occurred anyway and therefore do not really provide a “real” reduction 
from what was going to happen anyway.   
The CDM uses three approaches to assure offsets are real: (1) the 
barrier analysis (cost, policy barriers practically prevent the project without a 
CDM incentive); (2) the investment analysis (an alternative would be 
cheaper); and (3) a common practice analysis (it just is not common for this 
project to be done).74  These approaches are all problematic.  One analysis 
found that 43% of the projects reviewed did not provide or mention evidence 
for the barriers, and 30% of the projects using an investment analysis had 
key information lacking.75  Another survey was even more alarming: 
68. Id. at 390 n.12.
69. See id. at 391.
70. Id. at 411, Table 1.
71. See id. at 414, Table 2.
72. See Citizens Climate Lobby v. California Air Resources Bd., No. CGC-12-
519554, 2013 WL 861396 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Cnty. Cal., 2013) (hereinafter 
“Statement of Decision”), available at http://webaccess.sftc.org/minds_asp_pdf/Viewer/ 
DownLoadDocument.asp?PGCNT=0. 
73. Id. at 10.
74. Lambert Schneider, Is the CDM Fulfilling Its Environmental and Sustainable
Development Objectives? An Evaluation of the DM and Options for Improvement, ÖKO-INSTITUT 8 
(Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/622/2007-162-en.pdf. 
75. Id.
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In a Delphi survey, 71% of the participants agreed with the 
statement that “many CDM projects would also be implemented 
without registration under the CDM” and even 86% of the 
participants affirmed that “in many cases, carbon revenues are 
the icing on the cake, but are not decisive for the investment 
decision.”76 
This kind of analysis was particularly persuasive to the Citizens Climate 
Lobby Judge.77  The Judge also noted that it “can take between two and two-
and-a-half years to issue the first credit after commencing a project . . . . 
These bottlenecks and delays are caused by the inability of the CDM’s 
administrative structure to handle the high number of proposed projects 
due to the length and complexity of the administrative process, as well as 
the shortage of available emission verifiers.”78 
IV. California Offset Program
Unsurprisingly, California attempted to avoid the CDM offset
problems.  AB 32 allows for offsets in a market-based strategy, but it does so 
recognizing the potential hazards of an offset program.  The statute explicitly 
requires that offsets be “real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, and 
enforceable by the state board.”79  They also must be “in addition to any 
greenhouse gas emission reduction otherwise required by law or regulation, 
and any other greenhouse gas emission reduction that otherwise would 
occur.”80   
The Legislature also wanted to assure that market trading systems 
would not exacerbate environmental justice, requiring ARB to consider local 
impacts of air pollution and the potential for direct, indirect and cumulative 
impacts.  In particular, ARB was to avoid any increases in toxic or criteria air 
pollutants in local communities.81 
The Legislature’s requirements are crucial as offsets by definition 
displace the emission reductions that would normally occur in the capped 
industries.  When the ARB adopted the Scoping Plan, it explicitly promised 
Californians secondary health benefits of its program in addition to 
greenhouse gas reductions: 
76. Id. at 9.
77. Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 9-10.
78. Id. at 10.
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(d)(1) (Deering 2013).
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(d)(2) (Deering 2013).
81. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b) (Deering 2013).
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Our analysis indicates that implementing the Scoping Plan will 
result in a reduction of 15 tons per day of combustion-generated 
soot (PM 2.5) and 61 tons per day of oxides of nitrogen 
(precursors to smog).  These reductions in harmful air pollution 
would provide the following estimated health benefits in 2020, 
above and beyond those projected to be achieved as a result of 
California’s other existing public health protection and 
improvement efforts: 
 An estimated 780 premature deaths statewide will be
avoided
 Almost 12,000 incidences of asthma and lower
respiratory symptoms will be avoided
 77,000 work loss days will be avoided.82
The ARB noted the potential problem of overusing offsets in the Scoping 
Plan: 
While some offsets provide benefits, allowing unlimited offsets 
would reduce the amount of reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions occurring within the sectors covered by the cap-and-
trade program.  This could reduce the local economic, 
environmental and public health co-benefits and delay the 
transition to low-carbon energy systems within the capped 
sectors that will be necessary to meet our long term climate 
goals.83  
However, beyond the statutory concerns about market programs and 
those applying to all AB 32 regulations discussed above, ARB had full 
discretion in implementing its offset program.  ARB defined an offset 
consistent with the statute and an allowance as being “a tradable 
compliance instrument issued by ARB that represents a GHG reduction or 
GHG removal enhancement of one metric ton of CO2E.  The GHG reduction 
or GHG removal enhancement must be real, additional, quantifiable, 
permanent, verifiable, and enforceable.”84 
ARB’s definition of “additional”, however, opened up the door to all of 
the Kyoto CDM problems with offsets.  It linked an offset to a comparison to 
a “conservative business-as-usual scenario”: 
82. SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at ES 11-12.
83. Id. at 37.
84. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(12) (2013).
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“Additional” means, in the context of offset credits, greenhouse 
gas emission reduction or removals that exceed any greenhouse 
gas reduction or removals otherwise required by law, regulation 
or legally binding mandate, and that exceed any greenhouse gas 
reductions or removals that would otherwise occur in a 
conservative business-as-usual scenario.85 
Identifying a business-as-usual scenario proved with the Kyoto CDM to 
be a complicated resource intensive process, prone to uncertainty and error, 
if not fraud.  ARB’s rather abstract definition of “Business as Usual Scenario” 
hardly solved the problem: 
Business-as-Usual Scenario” means the set of conditions 
reasonably expected to occur within the offset project boundary 
in the absence of the financial incentives provided by offset 
credits, taking into account all current laws and regulations, as 
well as current economic and technological trends.86 
Nor did its definition of “conservative” in reference to the scenario provide 
much specificity, merely requiring that the estimated greenhouse gas 
reductions be “more likely than not” to be “understated”: 
“Conservative” means, in the context of offsets, utilizing project 
baseline assumptions, emission factors, and methodologies that 
are more likely than not to understate net GHG reductions or 
GHG removal enhancements for an offset project to address 
uncertainties affecting the calculation or measurement of GHG 
reductions or GHG removal enhancements.87 
Instead, the ARB provided that it would administratively create “offset 
protocols” that would provide the methodology for determining whether 
emission reduction activities would qualify for offsets.88  ARB hoped to 
sidestep Kyoto’s project by project issues by relying upon uniform threshold 
performance standards within categories of offset projects that would 
“Establish the eligibility and additionality of projects using standard criteria, 
and quantify GHG reductions and GHG removal enhancements using 
standardized baseline assumptions, emission factors, and monitoring 
85. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(4) (2013).
86. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(34) (2013).
87. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(58) (2013).
88. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95971-95972 (2013).
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methods.”89  The  threshold performance standards would act as 
nonrebuttable presumptions that the activity would be real and additional. 
The ARB hoped these performance standards could shortcut project 
approval, minimize the intensity of project-by-project review yet assure the 
integrity of an offset award. 
The ARB has now approved four protocols for separate categories of 
offsets: Ozone Depleting Substances Projects; Livestock Projects; Urban 
Forest Projects and U.S. Forest Projects.90  Each protocol describes offset 
standards and the method of exacting the correct amount of credits.  These 
protocols are primarily directed towards domestic California and other 
states’ activities. 
ARB, however, has broader international ambitions with offsets.  This 
ambition is based in the Global Warming Solutions Act itself:  
The state board shall consult with other states . . . and other 
nations . . . to facilitate the development of integrated and cost-
effective regional, national, and international greenhouse gas 
reduction programs.91  
How these linkages were to be made to other states and nations was 
left to the ARB until recently.  The Legislature in 2012 provided the following 
requirements: 
(f)A state agency, including, but not limited to, the State Air
Resources Board, shall not link a market-based compliance
mechanism established pursuant to [California Health and Safety
Code Section 38500] with any other state, province, or country
unless the state agency notifies the Governor that the agency
intends to take such action and the Governor, acting in his or her
independent capacity, makes all of the following findings:
(1) The jurisdiction with which the state agency proposes to link
has adopted program requirements for greenhouse gas
reductions, including, but not limited to, requirements for
offsets, that are equivalent to or stricter than those required by
Division 25.5 (commencing with Section 38500) of the Health and
Safety Code.
(2) Under the proposed linkage, the State of California is able to
enforce Division 25.5 (commencing with Section 38500) of the
Health and Safety Code and related statutes, against any entity
subject to regulation under those statutes, and against any entity
89. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95972 (a)(9) (2013).
90. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95973 (a)(2)(C)(1-4) (2013).
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38564 (Deering 2013).
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located within the linking jurisdiction to the maximum extent 
permitted under the United States and California Constitutions. 
(3) The proposed linkage provides for enforcement of applicable
laws by the state agency or by the linking jurisdiction of program
requirements that are equivalent to or stricter than those
required by Division 25.5 (commencing with Section 38500) of
the Health and Safety Code.
(4) The proposed linkage and any related participation of the
State of California in Western Climate Initiative, Incorporated,
shall not impose any significant liability on the state or any state
agency for any failure associated with the linkage.
(g) The Governor shall issue findings pursuant to subdivision (f)
within 45 days of receiving a notice from a state agency, and shall
provide those findings to the Legislature.  The findings shall
consider the advice of the Attorney General.  The findings to be
submitted to the Legislature shall not be unreasonably withheld.
The findings shall not be subject to judicial review.92
To demonstrate that offsets would meet these requirements, 
particularly the (f)(1) requirement that linked offsets be subject to 
equivalent requirements as well as enforceable under (f)(2) and (f)(3), is not 
an easy task.  The ARB is actively considering linking to provinces in Mexico 
and Brazil for forestry offsets (and has now linked with Quebec).93  The ARB, 
anticipating linkages for forestry offsets from developing countries, has 
adopted provisions for “sector” offsets in addition to its individual protocol 
offsets.94  These offsets allow developing countries or subnational 
jurisdictions within those countries to receive credits from carbon removed 
or sequestered from the atmosphere by a specific sector (e.g., reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation known as REDD plans) 
within a particular jurisdiction.95  The idea is that if in a large geographical 
area overall degradation or deforestation is reduced with plans to assure 
leakage and fraud are avoided, credits will be allowed. 
ARB’s backstop for any problems with offsets is limiting the amount of 
offsets that could be used for a facility’s compliance.  Total offsets may be 
92. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894(f) (Deering 2013).
93. THE REDD OFFSET WORKING GROUP, CALIFORNIA, ACRE AND CHIAPAS, PARTNERING 
TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM TROPICAL DEFORESTATION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONSERVE
TROPICAL RAINFORESTS, PROTECT LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND REDUCE STATE-WIDE GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS 2 (Evan Johnson, eds., 2013) (July 2013) [hereinafter ROW
RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://greentechleadership.org/documents/2013/07/row- 
final-recommendations-2.pdf.  
94. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95991 (2013).
95. See id.
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no more than 8% of a facility’s allowed emissions.96  Sector offsets may be 
more no more than 2% of a facility’s emissions during the first two 
compliance periods, and no more than 4% during the third compliance 
period ending in 2020.97  Note these limits are of a facility’s total emissions, 
not the amount of emissions that each facility is expected to reduce under 
the program. 
While this seems to be a very cautious limitation on offsets, in fact 
offsets by 2020 could cover all of the expected reductions from cap-and-
trade when the cap is at its most stringent, and presumably, able to achieve 
the most benefits for Californians.  As indicated above, in 2008, the ARB 
estimated this additional reduction from cap-and-trade to account for 34 
MMTCO2E by 2020.
98  However, in light of the recession, and thanks to a new 
environmental review required by a successful court challenge to the 
environmental analysis of the Scoping Plan under the California 
Environmental Quality Act, ARB now believes cap-and-trade need only 
achieve 18 MMTCO2E of reduction.
99  
Meanwhile, ARB’s final regulations set the 2020 allowance budget at 
334.2 MMTCO2E.  Under the 8% offset cap described above, the total amount 
of offsets that are allowed in 2020 are therefore about 27 MMTCO2E.
100  
Under the 4% international offset cap, half of that amount may be allocated 
to international offsets, that is, about 13.5 MMTCO2E, by 2020.  Thirteen and 
one-half MMTCO2E of international offsets is 75% of the 18 MMTCO2E of 
reductions now anticipated under cap-and-trade to come from power plants, 
refineries and the other capped sources.  Domestic offsets from farms, 
forests, and City tree planting and other approved sources of domestic 
offsets could completely eliminate any reductions from the capped sources 
expected to come from cap-and-trade.  In effect, offsets could be more than 
the entire cap-and-trade ballgame, and if a significant number are not real, 
they would jeopardize the program’s effectiveness. 
The ARB has also pledged to keep offsets below 49% of all of AB32’s 
reductions.101  However, given that the total reductions from capped sectors 
amount is approximately 146.7 MMTCO2E,
102 this provides no additional 
restriction beyond what the 8% limit accomplishes.   
96. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95854(b) (2013).
97. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95854(c) (2013).
98. See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, Table 2 at 17.
99. See FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE AB 32 SCOPING PLAN FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT 
DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 12, Table 1.2-3. 
100. See ROW RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 93, at 18, Figure 1.5.
101. See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 37.
102. See id. at 21, figure 3.
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Thus, even if offsets are real and additional, which is questionable as 
discussed more fully below, the contribution made by cap-and-trade to the 
secondary health benefits promised in the Scoping Plan may be displaced or 
eliminated.  As discussed below, this use of offsets for the capped facilities 
raises serious civil rights issues. 
V. Offsets, Civil Rights, and Environmental Justice
To the extent cap-and-trade reductions are to come from refineries,
power plants and other industrial sources, allowing these facilities to 
“offset” required emission reductions or shield emission increases of 
greenhouse gases raises serious civil rights and environmental justice 
concerns.  As the ARB noted in the Scoping Plan, as described above, AB 32 
provides significant co-benefits by reducing greenhouse gases and their co-
pollutants at industrial facilities.  Offsets by displacing these benefits have 
the potential to reduce these benefits.103   
Moving emission reductions from industrial to nonindustrial activities 
such as forestry management are especially troublesome, as Professor Alice 
Kaswan has pointed out: 
For example, under an offset program, a timber company could 
plant or preserve trees that would sequester carbon.  The timber 
company could then sell credits representing the sequestered 
carbon to an industrial facility that would use them to offset its 
carbon emissions.  Assuming that the carbon sequestration 
project had environmental integrity, the GHG emission benefits 
would be the same.  The co-pollutant benefits would differ, 
however, because allowing facilities to use non-industrial offsets 
instead of industrial allowances would result in fewer GHG and 
co-pollutant emission reductions from the controlled industrial 
sectors.104  
The California Legislature therefore required the ARB to “[e]nsure that 
activities undertaken to comply with the regulations do not 
disproportionately impact low-income communities.”105  Further the Board 
must “[e]nsure that activities undertaken . . . complement, and do not 
interfere with, efforts to achieve and maintain federal and state ambient air 
quality standards and to reduce toxic air contaminant emissions.”106  
103. See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5, at 80-81.
104. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30
UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 51, 105 (2012). 
105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(2) (Deering 2013).
106. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(4) (Deering 2013).
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Adversely affecting minority and low-income communities or denying them 
the benefits of a program would constitute violations of federal and state 
civil rights statutes.107 
Consistent with these laws, AB 32 mandates benefits to disadvantaged 
communities:  
The state board shall ensure that the greenhouse gas emission 
reduction rules, regulations, programs, mechanisms, and 
incentives . . . direct public and private investment toward the 
most disadvantaged communities in California and provide an 
opportunity for . . . community institutions to participate in and 
benefit from statewide efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.108   
The major stationary sources of air pollution in California are 
disproportionately located in minority or poor communities.109  A recent 
evaluation by the California Environmental Protection Agency using a multi-
factor analysis of pollution found that among the top 10% of the worst zip 
codes, the percentage of Hispanics jumps from their statewide average of 
37.6% to 63.8%; African Americans jump from 5.8% to 9.5%.110  Similar results 
have been found on a national level.111   
107. See Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); see also CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 11135 (Deering 2013) (prohibiting the state from carrying out programs that 
adversely impact communities of color or low-income communities or deny them the 
benefits of a program). 
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38565 (Deering 2013).
109. See Manuel Pastor, Rachel Morello-Frosch, James Sadd & Justin Scoggins,
Minding the Climate Gap:  What’s At Stake if California’s Climate Law Isn’t Done Right and Right 
Away at 3 (2010) [hereinafter What’s at Stake], available at http://dornsife.use.edu/pere/ 
documents/mindingthegap.pdf; See also Manuel Pastor, Jr., Rachel Morello-Frosch, 
and James Sadd, Still Toxic After All These Years:  Air Quality and Environmental Justice in the 
San Francisco Bay Area at 2 (2007) [hereinafter Still Toxic], available at http://cjtc. 
ucsc.edu/docs/bay_final.pdf. 
110. Matthew Rodriguez & George V. Alexeeff, California Communities
Environmental Health Screening Tool (CalEnviroscreen 1.1), OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
HAZARD ASSESSMENT 118, available at http://oehha.ca.gov/ej/pdf/CalEnviroscreenVer11 
report.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
111. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008, REDUCING 
RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 3 (1992) (“There are clear differences between racial groups 
in terms of disease and death rates . . . . Racial minority and low-income populations 
experience higher than average exposures to selected air pollutants, hazardous waste 
facilities, contaminated fish and agricultural pesticides in the workplace.”); for more 
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Environmental Justice activists are concerned about the loss of co-
benefits within a cap-and-trade system with offsets.  They doubt that a 
program that will facilitate payments for offsets and emission reductions 
moving from industrial based communities that are disproportionately 
populated by people of color to rural communities that are predominantly 
white actually directs “public and private investment toward the most 
disadvantaged communities in California,” as AB 32’s section 38565 
requires: 
Cap and Trade is an ineffective system because it does not 
require major polluters to reduce their carbon emissions.  Cap 
and Trade allows major emitters of greenhouse gases to buy 
“reductions” from other polluters instead of reducing their own 
pollution.  Polluters may also avoid reducing their emissions by 
purchasing “offsets.”  Offsets can be bought from a source nearly 
anywhere in the world and go to fund ecofriendly projects.  So 
while trees are being planted in Canada, corporations can 
continue to pollute back home in California at levels equal to or 
even greater than they did before AB 32. Cap and Trade deprives 
nearby residents from the benefits of toxic, smog, and particulate 
matter pollution reductions that would accompany local 
greenhouse gas reductions.  Environmental justice communities 
burdened by huge industrial concentrations of pollution would 
recent data, see also Robert D. Bullard, Paul Mohai, Robin Saha & Beverly Wright, Toxic 
Wastes and Race at Twenty: Why Race Still Matters After All Of These Years, 1978-2007 at 398-
399 (2007), available at  http://www.sph.umich.edu/symposium/2010/pdf/bullard1.pdf 
(“In 2000, people of color and the poor thus continue to be particularly vulnerable to 
the various negative impacts of hazardous waste facilities.  Moreover, the present 
findings show that this is the case for African Americans, Hispanics and 
Asians/Pacaific Islanders.”).  Two more recent studies in 2008 and 2009 using new 
EPA databases assessing risks in neighborhoods around major industrial sources 
found that “African Americans and Hispanics were the first or second most pollution-
burdened racial groups in more than half of the metropolitan areas studied” and 
“average exposures for minorities . . . are two to three times those of whites.”  David 
E. Adelman, The Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution:  Implications for Greenhouse Gas
Trading and Toxic Hotspots, 88 IND. L.J. 273, 285-286 (2013), available at http://www.
repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11041&context=ilj. According to
Adelman, both studies agreed “African Americans had a higher likelihood of being
exposed to disparate health risks from industrial air toxics and for the risks to be
greater than those of other groups.”  Id. at 287.
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likely see no benefits when major polluters buy, instead of 
reduce, their pollution.112 
The California Legislature was especially concerned that market 
mechanisms may cause environmental injustice.  Thus, the legislature in AB 
32 reprised its cautionary language applicable to the entire program113 when 
setting out the parameters for the use of  market mechanisms: 
Prior to the inclusion of any market-based compliance 
mechanism in the regulations . . . the state board shall do all of 
the following: 
(1) Consider the potential for direct, indirect, and cumulative
emission impacts from these mechanisms, including localized
impacts in communities that are already adversely impacted by
air pollution.
(2) Design any market-based compliance mechanism to prevent
any increase in the emissions of toxic air contaminants or criteria
air pollutants.114
The importance of assuring that the benefits of AB 32 are shared and 
that adverse impacts, particularly to disadvantaged communities, are 
avoided, is reflected in the process leading to ARB’s Scoping Plan115: 
This plan reflects the input of Californians at every level.  Our 
partners at other State agencies, in the legislature, and at the 
local government level have provided key input.  We’ve met with 
members of community groups to address environmental justice 
issues, with representatives of California’s labor force to ensure 
that good jobs accompany our transition to a clean energy future, 
and with representatives of California’s small businesses to 
ensure that this vital part of our state’s economic engine 
flourishes under this plan.  We’ve heeded the advice of public 
health and environmental experts throughout the state to design 
the plan so that it provides valuable co-benefits in addition to 
cutting greenhouse gases.  Scoping Plan, p. ES-3. 
112. Eileen Gauna, Environmental Law, Civil Rights and Sustainability: Three
Frameworks for Environmental Justice, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 34, 57 n.70 (Summer, 
2012) (quoting Center on Race, Poverty & Environment).  
113. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38562(b)(2), 38562(b)(4) (Deering 2013).
114. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570(b) (Deering 2013).
115. Available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scop
ing_plan.pdf. 
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As concerning as these environmental justice implications are about 
domestic offsets, it would be even more alarming if the offsets are not fully 
real or additional.  That would mean that health benefits are not merely 
being relocated or redistributed in a manner that impacts certain 
communities, but are actually eliminated for anyone in California.  As 
discussed below, environmental justice organizations, human rights 
organizations, litigants in a pending lawsuit and at least one California 
legislator are now raising serious questions about the effectiveness of these 
domestic and international offset provisions, and their legality. 
VI. Domestic Offsets Litigation
On March 27, 2012, the Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s
Earth Foundation filed a complaint in San Francisco Superior Court 
challenging the offset protocols that ARB had adopted for their reliance 
upon the performance standard approach to offsets.116  In this case, which 
has been adjudicated in the trial court and is now on appeal at the time of 
the drafting of this article, the plaintiffs contended that the performance 
standard approach would not assure that the greenhouse gas reductions 
signified by the offset were in fact “additional” for each offset project.  The 
plaintiffs argued that the ARB’s approach appears to be problematic, given 
that it defined “additional” as requiring reductions beyond  “any greenhouse 
gas reduction or removals otherwise required by law, regulation or legally 
binding mandate, and that exceed any greenhouse gas reductions or 
removals that would otherwise occur in a conservative business-as-usual 
scenario (emphasis added).”117  
The conservative business-as-usual scenario, described previously, 
already seemed to have its own problems.  The purported offset reductions 
would be compared to a business-as-usual scenario that only required a 
“conservative” “more likely than not” assurance that emissions were 
understated in the business as usual scenarios.  To put it another way, if 
there were a 49% chance that the business-as usual scenario was overstated, 
there was a significant chance the offsets would be partially or completely 
unreal, or not additional.  Now, adding protocols based upon performance 
standards that make broad assumptions about whether the offset activity 
would occur without offset revenue would seem to only magnify the risks 
with offsets.   
116. See Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Found. v. Cal. Air 
Res. Bd., CGC-12-519554 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Cnty, Cal., March 28, 2012), 
available at http://webaccess.sftc.org/minds_asp_pdf/Viewer/DownLoadDocument.asp? 
PGCNT=0. 
117. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(4) (2013).
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The development of the particular protocols suggests the plaintiff’s 
concerns were more than theoretical.  The ARB has now approved four offset 
protocols.118  Each one utilizes a threshold performance standard that 
assumes if an activity occurs, the activity must be in addition to the more-
likely-than-not business-as-usual scenario and a result of the offset credit 
incentive. 
For example, the Livestock Protocol awards offsets to dairy and swine 
farms for containing methane emissions from manure.119  Anaerobic 
digesters trap the methane and then destroy them through flaring or 
harness them to create heat and electricity.120  There was no dispute that 
employing these techniques would be useful to reduce the potent 
greenhouse gas methane121 from the atmosphere. 
The issue, however, was whether the use of a biogas control system is 
a business-as-usual practice.  The trial court noted that a report to the ARB 
“determined that 0.07% of all dairy farms and 0.02% of all swine farms in the 
United States use anaerobic digesters to dispose of manure.”122  The ARB 
then simply assumed that if a farmer were to use this technology then it 
would only be due to its offset protocol and therefore be additional.   
Plaintiffs pointed to a U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Report that suggested 
that these digesters could be profitable: 
We know that anaerobic digesters that convert animal manure 
into electricity are a powerful renewable resource.  One 700 head 
dairy herd can power 200 homes with electricity.  Yet, currently 
the United States is only utilizing dairy power on 2% of the farms 
that serve as candidates for profitable and sustainable sources of 
energy.123 
118. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95802(a)(3), (36), (60), (93); §§ 95970-97 (2013).
119. See AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, COMPLIANCE OFFSET 
PROTOCOL LIVESTOCK PROJECTS (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/cap 
andtrade10/coplivestockfin.pdf. 
120. Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 12.
121. Methane is 23 times more potent than CO
2 
over 100 years.  See CHRIS
WOLD, ET AL., supra note 22, at 7. 
122. Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 13.  A later EPA report found that
the percentage was 1.9% of dairy and swine farms where it is technically feasible to 
install them.  Id. 
123. Agriculture Secretary Vilsack Discusses How Obama Administration Is Partnering
With Farmers And Ranchers To Combat Climate Change, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., Dec. 
15, 2009, available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly= 
true&contentid=2009/12/0612.xml. 
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The U.S. Department of Agriculture announced that the dairy industry had 
pledged a 2% reduction in their greenhouse gases by 2020, years before 
ARB’s protocol was adopted and implemented.  The USDA actually already 
financially supported some farms, and indeed, later the U.S. EPA and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture formed a strategic initiative to encourage 
digesters.124   
The ARB, nevertheless, based simply upon the fact that anaerobic 
digesters were not “common practice,” determined that installation of 
anaerobic digesters was a sufficient performance standard to qualify as an 
offset.125  However, that surely begs the question, is a new digester a result 
of the federal initiative, the dairy industry’s commitment, the particular 
circumstances of a farm where converting methane may be profitable, or the 
impact of the offset protocol?  And if the answer is murky, would not that be 
true of the validity of the offset?  
  A similar question arises with each of the protocols.  With the Ozone 
Depleting Substances Projects, the ARB staff again found that destruction of 
these chemicals used in appliances or building foam or in refrigerant 
equipment was not “common practice.”126  Thus, under the rule, it is 
assumed that destruction of the specific chemicals regulated (those where 
import or production are banned but not their use in the US under other 
laws such as the Montreal Protocol) is additional.  The ARB does make a 
general assessment of how likely each chemical would have been released, 
reducing the credit, but if it is destroyed it is entitled to an offset 
notwithstanding what the particular owner or manufacturer might have done 
in the absence of the offset program.127 
The two forestry protocols face notable difficulty in assuring that all 
reductions are beyond “any” that would result from the business-as-usual 
scenario.  The Urban Forests protocol applies “tree planting and 
maintenance activities in urban areas along streets, in parks, on educational 
124. See EPA Administrator and Agriculture Secretary Team Up to Promote Farm Energy
Generation Agreement Will Help Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, UNITED STATES ENVTL PROT.
AGENCY, May 3, 2010, available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e77fdd4 
f5afd88a3852576b3005a604f/eddc8a628ce5e9b2852577180066c2d3!OpenDocument.  
125. CAL. AIR RES. BD., STAFF REPORT AND COMPLIANCE OFFSET PROTOCOL LIVESTOCK 
MANURE (DIGESTER) PROJECTS 5 (2010). 
126. See Statement of Decision, supra at note 72, at 30.
127. See AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, STAFF REPORT AND
COMPLIANCE OFFSET PROTOCOL U.S. OZONE DEPLETING SUBSTANCES PROJECTS 4-7 (2010), 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/cappt3.pdf. 
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campuses, and in utility service areas.”128  The protocol’s performance 
standard is a “Net Tree Gain.”129  The ARB is assuming that any city or college 
or municipality that plants more trees than die is doing so because of the 
offsets.  Further, it is assumed upon the entity’s agreement that this will 
continue for 100 years, until annual reporting indicates otherwise.  This 
requirement makes sense, in that there is ultimately no gain from a tree 
absorbing carbon if it is ultimately cut down and carbon is then released. 
However, it also means that for ten, or twenty, or thirty years credits could 
be generated that would be illusory if trees are cut down or die  at any point 
before one hundred years.   
Utilities do not even have to show a net tree gain: 
Most utilities do not have tree planting programs that go beyond 
replacing trees removed during line clearance operations.  While 
some have programs specifically aimed at storing carbon and 
conserving energy in residential households, on average utilities 
are planting fewer than 400 trees annually in these types of 
programs.  All trees planted under these types of programs are 
considered additional and therefore are designated as eligible 
project trees.130 
The implication in the ARB’s discussion of its utility protocol is that 
some utilities already have tree-planting programs.  Would other utilities 
have proceeded accordingly?  Do the ones that do have programs get credit 
for what they are already doing, presumably so.  The trial court’s decision 
points to a survey of urban cities showing “that a third of surveyed cities 
have a net tree loss and many others have a tiny net tree gain.”131  But what 
of the other cities that experience above a minimal net gain?  Is it really the 
case that California’s cities have no incentives to expand the number of 
trees in their cities without the offset protocol?   
The last protocol is for U.S. Forest Projects addressing “forest 
management activities . . . designed to increase removals of CO2 from the 
atmosphere, or reduce or prevent emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere . . . 
128. AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, STAFF REPORT AND COMPLIANCE
OFFSET PROTOCOL U.S. URBAN FOREST PROJECTS 4 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca. 
gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/cappt2.pdf. 
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 6.
131. Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 31.
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through increasing and/or conserving forest carbon stocks.”132  For 
reforestation projects, a developer “must demonstrate that the land has 
been out of forest cover for 10 years.”133  Projects are assumed to continue 
for 100 years, but if subsequent monitoring and reporting demonstrates a 
termination of the project, at least the ARB requires that additional trees be 
maintained as a buffer system of contributed or deducted credits from the 
offset award that creates in effect an insurance system.134  The sufficiency of 
this insurance system, that is, will enough additional trees be maintained to 
counter failures in tree credits, will be unknown for decades to come.  
From a policy standpoint, the performance standard approach to 
offsets raises serious questions, particularly as offsets could potentially 
dominate the reductions expected from cap-and-trade as discussed above. 
If offsets are 25% illusory because they partially award credits for activities 
that were already occurring, then that would mean that 25% of the 
reductions that would have produced health co-benefits and made progress 
towards greenhouse gas reduction goals would be foregone in lieu of the 
offsets. 
The role of a court, however, is to determine the legality of regulations 
that are challenged, not necessarily their wisdom.  The San Francisco trial 
court’s approach and analysis is interesting, not only from a legal standpoint 
but from its greenhouse gas policy standpoint. 
California’s case law on administrative review of regulations is 
sometimes vague.  “The appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny in any 
particular case is perhaps not susceptible of precise formulation, but lies 
somewhere along a continuum with nonreviewability at one end and 
independent judgment at the other.”135  This deference is fundamentally a 
two-step process.  First, in the words of a statute codifying the case law,  the 
regulation must be “consistent and not in conflict with the statute . . . .”136  
The standard of review is normally de novo, though there are exceptions 
where the courts use an arbitrary and capricious standard.137  Then in the 
words of the statute, the regulation must be “reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the statute.”  The test here is the arbitrary and 
132. AIR RESOURCES BD., CAL. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, STAFF REPORT AND COMPLIANCE
OFFSET PROTOCOL U.S. FOREST PROJECTS 5 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
regact/2010/capandtrade10/cappt5.pdf. 
133. Id. at 6.
134. See id. at 8.
135. Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1, 7 (1998). 
136. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 11342.2 (Deering 2013).
137. Yamaha, 19 Cal.4th at 16 (Mosk, concurring).
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capricious standard, which asks if the agency’s action was “arbitrary, 
capricious, or without reasonable or rational basis.”138  
ARB’s discretion, as described above, is quite sweeping.  The San 
Francisco trial court appropriately focused upon the performance standard 
approach.  However, the court sliced the two-step analysis in an interesting 
fashion.  While some courts look at the specific regulation to determine if it 
was consistent with the statute, the trial court looked at the concept of the 
regulation to determine if it was consistent with the statute.  The trial court 
considered the content of the particular performance standard in each 
protocol to be merely the exercise of ARB’s discretion, and if it were 
reasonable, then it was permitted. 
In theory, a performance standard is quite appealing given the 
drawbacks of Kyoto’s project-by-project approach.  The experience of the 
Kyoto CDM process drove the ARB and later the trial court’s reasoning in 
supporting the performance standard approach.  Yet, the first step does not 
disappear once one reviews the specific regulation.  If the specific regulation 
is contrary to law, it is still invalid, and that is subject to a de novo review. 
For example, in the Communities for a Better Environment case,139 the court 
examined a number of guidelines (deemed regulations) under the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).140  One of the regulations has to do with 
“Thresholds of Significance: Use of Regulatory Standards to Determine 
Significant Environmental Effect.”141  CEQA requires an environmental 
impact report for a project if it “may have a significant effect on the 
environment.”142  At the beginning stage of a CEQA process, the standard for 
determining whether a project may have a significant effect is whether “it 
can be fairly argued on the basis of substantial evidence that the project 
may have significant environmental impact.”143 
On the other hand, in a section that was not disputed in the 
Communities for a Better Environment case, the Guidelines also allow for local 
agencies to adopt “thresholds,” akin to performance standards, that 
generally provide a standard for any project to determine significance, that 
is, “a quantitative or qualitative standard, or set of criteria, pursuant to 
138. Communities for a Better Env’t v. Cal. Res. Agency, 103 Cal.App.4th 98,
109 (2002). 
139. Id.
140. CEQA begins at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 2013) [hereinafter
CEQA]; the Guidelines are at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15000 (2013) [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
141. Guidelines, supra note 140, at § 15064(h).
142. CEQA, supra note 140, at §§ 21151, 21100(a), 21080(d), 21082.2(a).
143. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal.3d 68, 75 (1974).
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which the significance of a given environmental effect may be 
determined.”144 
The Court of Appeal decision had little trouble finding this Guideline 
to be contrary to the statute’s insistence upon a fair argument being 
sufficient to force a full environmental impact report, “regardless of whether 
other substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion.”145  However, 
the CBE court did so after having gone way beyond the concept of a 
threshold being useful for an agency in its first appraisal, which again, no 
party disputed.  It considered the specific language of the regulation and 
what might potentially happen if a party made a fair argument in an actual 
case.  “It ignores the real issue here—the application of an established 
regulatory standard in a way that forecloses the consideration of any other 
substantial evidence showing there may be a significant effect.”146 
The trial court in the offset case addresses the idea of a performance 
standard as an abstract de novo issue, and then considers the actual 
protocol with the actual performance standard as an arbitrary and capricious 
standard issue.  This practice seems to be inconsistent with the Communities 
for a Better Environment case approach.  There, the appellate court delved into 
the particular wording of the regulation to determine if it could be contrary 
to the statute.  For offsets, the San Francisco Superior Court ignored the 
actual performance standard in determining statutory compliance and then 
evaluated the actual protocol adopted only as to whether it was arbitrary. 
As result, the trial court failed to fully grapple with the implications of 
these protocols.  The trial court noted that all parties agree that the statute 
required that “each and every reduction must be additional.”147  The court 
then states that “it is not . . . easy to precisely determine whether a 
reduction is additional.”148  In fact, according to the trial court, “Determining 
additionality is difficult, and it is impossible to precisely delineate between 
additional and non-additional projects.”  It further discusses the baseline or 
business-as-usual scenario: 
By including the term “more likely than” this definition admits 
that GHG reductions might not be understated, that they could 
be overstated or include non-additional reductions.149 
144. Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency,
103 Cal.App.4th 98, 110-111 (2002). 
145. Id. at 110, 114.
146. Id. at 114.
147. Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 23.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 24.
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The court then concedes that the offset program will give credits to 
actual projects that are not additional: 
Petitioners attempt to show the Legislature did not intend for 
Respondent to use a standards-based approach by pointing to a 
handful of digesters, ODS programs, urban forest projects, and 
U.S. forest projects.  They contend that these few projects are 
non-additional but will receive offset credits prove the failure of 
Respondent’s Protocols.  Whether a particular digester, ODS 
program, or tree is additional has no bearing on whether the 
Legislature delegated to respondent the power to use a 
standards-based approach.150 
The Trial Court may be right that in the abstract, the ARB can use a 
standard- based approach, but if the standard allows projects that are not 
additional, it would contradict the statute.  As the court had previously 
admitted, no one disputes that every offset project must be additional.   
Once the court gets by its de novo review of performance standards in 
general, it was easy for the court to sustain the protocols as not arbitrary. 
For the Livestock protocol, the court found evidence supporting ARB’s 
determination that the use of digesters is “above and beyond common 
practice,” with one report estimating that “[s]ixty-nine anaerobic digesters, 
out of the 8,000 that could be installed, would be installed without offset 
credits.”151   
It similarly found evidence based on a study that the destruction of 
refrigerant ODS without incentive from the carbon market is not a common 
market activity.152  When the petitioners asked the court to look behind the 
conclusion of the study to see if they were supported by the evidence, the 
court stated: “[U]nder an arbitrary and capricious standard, it is not for this 
court to reweigh the evidence.  When treading into the murky waters of 
statistical analysis and scientific studies, the Court defers to Respondent’s 
expertise, experience, and sweeping grant of law-making powers.”153  
For the Urban Forest Protocol the court relied on that survey showing 
only that a third of the surveyed cities have a net tree loss and many others 
have a tiny net tree gain, dismissing evidence that urban tree programs were 
alive and well at various cities across the country, including its home town 
150. Id.
151. Id. at 13, 27.
152. Id. at 29-30.
153. Id. at 30.
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in San Francisco.154  The court noted the significance of the protocol’s 
requirement that trees be maintained for 100 years—an admittedly 
problematic likelihood in today’s urban world; however, the court ignored 
the similar likelihood of any regulatory regime lasting 100 years in a state 
that is barely more than 150 years old.155  In the end, the court hid behind 
the arbitrary and capricious standard: “[a] regulation is not arbitrary or 
capricious if Respondent has considered all relevant factors and 
demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice 
made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.”156   
The court noted that the U.S. Forest Protocol was developed “in 
lengthy consultations with industrial and non-industrial forest managers, 
experts from California and federal forest agencies, environmental 
organizations, forest landowners, and forestry scientists.”157  Again, the Court 
found that the ARB had “considered all relevant factors and has 
demonstrated how its choices support the purposes of the Act.”158 
The Court refused to apply any higher standard of review to the 
Protocols: 
Any higher standard makes no practical sense as this Court 
would have to quickly acquire the skill and expertise necessary to 
adroitly examine the anaerobic digester market, the ODS 
destruction market, the common practices of urban forest 
planting, and management practices for forests across the United 
States.159  
The broad scope of ARB’s authority to pick and choose its strategies for 
addressing climate change,160 and the trial court’s own admitted lack of 
expertise clearly influenced the trial court.161   
154. See Petitioners’ Reply Brief, Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s
Earth Found. v. California Air Res. Bd. (San Francisco County Superior Court, Cal., 
Case No. CGC-12-519554, October 9, 2012) at 37. 
155. See Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 30-31.
156. Id. at 31.
157. Id. at 32.
158. Id. at 33.
159. Id. at 25.
160. Id. at 23 (“The Legislature granted Respondent vast discretion to
promulgate any type of GHG reduction measure.”). 
161. Id. at 30 (“When trading into the murky waters of statistical analysis and
scientific studies, the Court defers to the Respondent’s expertise, experience, and 
sweeping grant of law-making powers.”). 
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Pursuant to this case’s appeal, the Court of Appeal will consider 
whether the trial court properly applied the standard of review for 
administrative regulations.  And it is, to use the ARB’s offset lexicon, more 
likely than not that the trial court will be sustained, as the California 
appellate courts seem unduly deferential to the ARB in carrying out this new 
program.  In the first case squarely addressing the implementation of AB32, 
the First District Appellate Court reviewed a challenge to the Scoping Plan 
because the “ARB ‘made no attempt to analyze potential disproportionate 
public health impacts to communities living closest to the facilities eligible 
to participate in the cap and trade system,” among other reasons.162  The 
Appellate Court dismissed this concern, citing a health study of a minority 
community inundated with refineries, power plants and other industrial and 
commercial operations.  The validity of the study, based upon facts with 
conclusions supported by the evidence, was not discussed, barely assuring 
the “hard look” required by federal and state courts in environmental review 
cases.163   
 However, regardless of the ultimate decision in this case on the 
offsets’ legality, from a policy perspective California will still have an offset 
program that does not assure additionality and by definition, may only 
provide as little as a 50.1% (more likely than not) confidence level that an 
offset represents a real reduction from a true business-as-usual scenario. 
This statistic remains alarming for a program that the trial court noted could 
displace “85% of all potential reductions.”164   
The trial court, after considering the Kyoto CDM flaws and the 
uncertainty in performance standards, could only throw up its hands and 
state: 
[The ARB] would have to abandon any use of offsets, and 
perhaps the entire cap-and-trade program, if this Court found 
that the Act’s ambit was transgressed every time a credited 
reduction was potentially non-additional.165 
The court may be indulging in “realpolitik” decisionmaking to save cap-
and-trade.  However, if an essential part of a market is that offsets are 
“additional,” California’s program may have a serious flaw.  Whether that 
162. Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Bd., 206
Cal.App.4th 1487, 1504 (2012). 
163. E.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); Ebbetts Pass
Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, 123 Cal.App.4th 1331, 
1345 (2004). 
164. Statement of Decision, supra note 72, at 6 n.5.
165. Id. at 24.
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flaw will actually be exploited by offset developers remains to be seen.  This 
flaw may be even more important with the advent of international offsets. 
VII. The International Linkage Problem
California’s desire to link its cap-and-trade program with other
countries raises additional unique issues.  The issues of additionality and 
permanence would play out in an arena where ARB has no authority and 
minimal ability to monitor.  It raises even more pronounced environmental 
justice issues because at least in theory the reduction of greenhouse gases 
through domestic offsets offers some potential of other co-benefits that 
might reach disadvantaged communities if the wind blows the right way. 
With international offsets, there is no question that offsets for activities in 
another country will come at the expense of disadvantaged communities 
that are disproportionately located near capped industries such as power 
plants and refineries. 
A. The Possible Benefits of Linkage and Offsets with Acre
and Chiapas
In describing the potential issues with international offsets, it is 
important to recognize certain benefits from the proposed linkages to other 
nations.  Climate change is a critical global issue, as well as a national issue, 
that profoundly affects disadvantaged communities.  Reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions anywhere is a benefit for the United States, California and all 
of its communities. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Fourth 
Assessment Report in 2007,166 the United States in its Global Climate 
Change Impacts in the United States report,167 and the World Bank in its 
Turn Down The Heat report168 have well documented what climate change 
means for the world, the United States and for the State of California.  The 
government of California argued strenuously in successfully advocating for a 
permissible waiver from the Clean Air Act’s preemption of state automobile 
rules, articulating that its automobile greenhouse gas rules were particularly 
166. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ 
ar4_syr.pdf. 
167. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/ 
pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf. 
168. THE WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT (2012), available at http://climate
change.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_cen
trigrade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf. 
   
West  Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2014 
144 
important for California.  The state cited the effect of global warming on its 
coast, its snowpack in the Sierras and related water issues, and noted how 
its metropolitan areas were vulnerable to climate change aggravated smog 
conditions.169   
The Program for Environmental and Regional Equity at USC has 
further documented in its Climate Gap report170 that impacts to low-income 
communities and communities of color in California from climate change 
will be particularly severe.  Climate change is an environmental justice issue 
for local communities as it is for communities around the globe.   
Deforestation in particular plays a large role in contributing to climate 
change.  “From 1850 to 1998, approximately one-third of man-made GHG 
emissions into the atmosphere came from releases due to land-use 
changes, mostly through deforestation.”171  Forested areas have decreased 
20% during the past 140 years.172  The Kyoto Protocol has long recognized 
that addressing deforestation may be a critical part of any strategy to 
address climate change.173   
Further, indigenous people have suffered dramatic injustice, especially 
when it comes to the environment.  Thus, indigenous people are the subject 
of the United Nation’s Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.174  
The island of Tuvulu175 and the Village of Kivalina176 are just two examples of 
the many indigenous victims of climate change.   
It has also been well documented and not necessary to repeat in depth 
the role of developing nations in the battle against climate change.  Their 
ability to develop their nations without using the carbon energy sources that 
western nations used for their development is a key problem in any climate 
strategy.  Thus, the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent post-Kyoto meetings 
have addressed the use of green funds and technology transfer to facilitate 
169. See Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards 
for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32744 (July 8, 2009). 
170. Rachel Morello-Frosch, Manuel Pastor, James Sadd & Seth Shonkoff, The
Climate Gap (May 2009), available at http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/documents/The_ 
Climate_Gap_Full_Report_FINAL.pdf. 
171. CHRIS WOLD ET AL., supra note 22, at 9.
172. CHRIS WOLD ET AL., supra note 22, at 8 (quoting INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY at 26-27). 
173. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 3, para. 3.
174. UNITED NATIONS, DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2008)
available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 
175. See Tuvalu and Global Warming, TUVALU ISLANDS, http://www.tuvaluislands.co
m/warming.htm (last visited July 8, 2013). 
176. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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development without carbon.177  In this regard, devising mechanisms to shift 
climate change resources south to developing nations is a positive step to 
take.178 
Offsets in particular provide an opportunity to leverage California’s 
program to achieve reductions in sectors or nations that are not currently 
under the AB 32 regulatory program and have not been well served by the 
Kyoto process.  Advocates of this approach believe sector offsets will lead to 
new programs and techniques to address greenhouse gases without difficult 
to enforce mandates.  The resulting innovations may then later serve as a 
basis for future regulation: 
[T]heir successful implementation could greatly multiply the
global impact of AB 32 by sending a signal to [countries linked to
California] that their hard work and political leadership in
mitigating climate change will be recognized and rewarded and
by providing a critical learning opportunity for other emerging
cap-and-trade programs as they consider whether to adopt
similar provisions . . . .179 
California’s use of a sector approach to develop offsets to reward 
efforts to reduce deforestation is intended to avoid the problems with the 
Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism that focused on a project-by-project 
approach.  According to California’s offset regulations: 
“Sector” or “Sectoral,” when used in conjunction with sector-
based crediting programs, means a group or subgroup of an 
economic activity, or a group or cross-section of a group of 
economic activities, within a jurisdiction.180   
As explained by its advocates: “These sorts of jurisdictional programs . . . 
have the potential to generate emissions reductions at much larger scale 
and lower cost than the traditional project-based model.”   
Further, the project approach makes “leakage,” the movement or 
transfer of emission causing activities, to another off-project site inevitable 
and difficult to track, and requires an extensive investigation of reference 
levels or the business-as-usual scenario which, as described above, is 
177. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 10(c).
178. The Green Climate Fund was established at the Cancun meeting under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  See Green Climate 
Fund, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ 
cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/green_climate_fund/items/5869.php.  
179. ROW RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 93, at 3.
180. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(256) (Deering 2013).
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vulnerable to miscalculation if not fraud.  Sector offset advocates believe the 
sector approach better avoids these issues: 
By defining performance across the entire jurisdiction for the two 
main types of emissions (forest conversion to lower-carbon land 
uses such as crops and pasture, and forest degradation through 
forest fires, logging, and other human-induced activities), risks of 
performance reversal and leakage at the project level can be 
absorbed into state-wide performance and accounting, 
appropriately directing attention to the large-scale changes in 
the rural development that are the essential foundation of 
permanent emissions reductions.181 
For all of these reasons, it is worthwhile to consider how a linkage that 
provides offsets for California’s program from reducing deforestation in 
Central and South America can be achieved in coordination with the AB 32 
framework.  This effort is consistent with AB 32’s requirement for exploring 
linkages with other states and countries.182 
The question is whether international linkages can be done credibly, 
assuring that offsets are rewarded for real, additional and permanent 
reductions.  There are serious issues as to whether California will be able to 
provide that kind of assurance. 
B. The Problem with International Offsets
1. International Offsets Raise Serious Civil Rights Issues
As discussed above with domestic offsets, for every ton of an 
international offset acquired by a power plant or refinery, there is one less 
ton of reduction of greenhouse gas at the facility, or even worse, permission 
to increase emissions by one ton, with all of the co-pollutants or co-hazards 
that go along with foregone emission reductions.183  These facilities are 
disproportionately located near low-income communities and communities 
of color.184  
Similar to domestic offsets, international offsets pose an 
environmental justice and civil rights problem.  Internationally, the issue is 
starker, as there is no question that the reductions in emissions do not 
181. ROW RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 93, at 4.
182. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38564 (Deering 2013).
183. See SCOPING PLAN, supra note 5 at 80-81.
184. See, e.g., What’s at Stake, supra note 109; Still Toxic, supra note 109; U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 111; Robert D. Bullard et al., supra note 
111; David E. Adelman, supra note 111. 
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affect California’s residents.  Moving emission reductions to Brazil or 
Mexico, for example, with money flowing out of California to purchase the 
offsets, clearly denies communities near power plants and refineries the co-
benefits and investment promised in the scoping plan. 
2. International Offsets in Developing Countries Pose
Special Problems in Assuring that They Will Be Real,
Permanent, Quantifiable, Verifiable, Additional, and
Enforceable Emission Reductions
With domestic offsets, the offset developer and capped source 
purchaser are within the ARB’s jurisdiction.  Regulations have been adopted 
that assure that if an offset is false, fails or otherwise is inadequate that the 
ARB can take enforcement action.185  The ARB can rely upon existing 
monitoring, inspections and other tools that an enforcement agency has 
available to it.   
An international offset in a developing country is inevitably dependent 
upon the host country or third parties to validate the activities giving rise to 
the offset.  Corruption at any stage in the development of the offset, from 
the initial reporting to the verification and monitoring will undermine the 
offset. 
Corruption is a serious problem in developing countries.  A brief 
review of the first two developing countries bidding to participate in the AB 
32 program is a reminder of how serious this issue is.  According to 
Transparency International, Brazil ranks 69th in its corruption index.186  
Mexico ranks 105th.187  For comparison, Canada, whose province Quebec is 
the first international linkage approved under AB 32, ranks ninth,188 and the 
United States ranks 19th.189   
The Heritage Foundation in its 2013 Index of Economic Freedom ranks 
Brazil at 100.190  Brazil’s freedom of corruption score is 38, a low score, with 
the foundation stating: “Despite some progress, corruption continues to be 
185. E.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95977.1, 95983, 96014 (2013).
186. Brazil—Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/country#BRA_DataResearch (last visited July 6, 2013). 
187. Mexico—Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/country#MEX (last visited July 6, 2013). 
188. Canada—Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/country#CAN (last visited July 6, 2013). 
189. United States—Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#USA_DataResearch (last visited July 6, 2013. 
190. Country Rankings—2013 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION, http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking. 
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pervasive.”191  Mexico’s freedom from corruption score is even worse, with a 
score of 30.  For comparison, the United States is ranked tenth in the world 
and its freedom of corruption score is 71.  Recent news articles about 
Brazil’s corruption trials and potential new investigations support these 
perceptions.192  Also, recent alarming stories about massive protests over 
corruption in Brazil indicate the extent of Brazil’s corruption problem.193  
Admittedly, there is technology today that would aid in the discovery 
and avoidance of fraudulent offsets, including satellite images.194  Whatever 
technology is used, however, the issue is the interpretation of data and the 
problem that there may be conflicts of interests in the verification of offsets. 
If the ARB is taking a passive role in assessing offsets, as suggested in its 
reliance upon international forestry programs known as REDD (“Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation”) in its regulations,195 
satellite images, for example, are not enough to guard against corruption 
and manipulation of data: This issue is thoroughly discussed by the U4 Anti 
Corruption Resource Center in its briefing paper, “Corruption and REDD+ 
Identifying Risks and Complexity”:  
Corruption in the implementation of REDD+ is linked to fraud in 
the collation and interpretation of data that will determine 
financial rewards.  REDD+ generates incentives for dishonest 
measurements and reporting on reforestation achievements, 
avoided deforestation and good forest stewardship.  Funds may 
be paid for projects that have not taken place, that have not been 
as successful as claimed, for achievements that would have 
occurred anyway (the problem of ‘additionality’), or are reversed 
after payments have been made (the problem of ‘permanence’). 
It is also possible that beneficiaries of REDD+ payments may 
attempt to exert undue influence or offer illicit financial 
191. Brazil—2013 Index of Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/brazil (last visited July 6, 2013). 
192. See “Brazil prosecutors want ex-president investigated,” AP reported in
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 6, 2013, available at http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Brazil-
prosecutors-want-ex-president-investigated-4414812.php.   
193. Simon Romero, Protests Widen as Brazilians Chide Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/americas/brazilian-leaders 
-brace-for-more-protests.html?pagewanted=all.
194. ROW RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 93, at 42-43.
195. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95993(a) (2013) (“Sector-based credits may be
generated from . . . REDD plans.”). 
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payments to agencies responsible for data production and 
analysis.  The profits in doing so may be substantial.196 
Corruption is a difficult problem to measure because of its 
pervasiveness and secrecy, and this problem is exacerbated when measured 
on an international scale.  For an international offset to provide some 
measure of assurance, the ARB would have to be proactively involved in a 
manner similar to what it does with domestic offsets.  However, the ARB 
does not have the international tools that the federal government has, for 
example, a State Department.  Even if it did, the ARB’s authority would be 
limited by international law if it tried to interfere with another nation’s 
sovereignty. 
Beyond the issue of corruption, the technical problems of assuring 
that reductions are additional and permanent are quite complex.  The key to 
any cap-and-trade and related offset program is that the baseline or 
reference level for offsets is set to assure that any emissions reductions are 
additional to what would happen without the program.   
Otherwise, the program is foregoing additional reductions to what 
would occur without the program, making the program irrelevant. 
The main motivation in encouraging offsets in developing countries is 
the enhancement of forests.  The question becomes, what is the business-
as-usual scenario in a situation when deforestation, the destruction of 
forests, is business as usual?  If a lowering of the rate of deforestation is 
considered an emissions reduction, all that means is that less trees are 
being cut down.  This is a far cry from the ARB’s domestic Urban Forest 
Protocol using a performance standard of a net gain in trees.  Until there is 
actually an increase in trees, the ability to remove carbon continues to 
decline and yet offsets can be rewarded.   
Even if one accepts the pragmatism of rewarding a declining rate of 
deforestation, determining whether to award credits still requires 
determining the appropriate baseline.  If one bases the rate on a multiyear 
analysis, then it is possible that simply maintaining the same rate of 
deforestation of the prior year, if less than the multiple year period, would 
lead to the award of credits.  Then the question becomes, how many years 
does one include in the baseline, and why was there a lower rate in the most 
recent of those many years.  Was it an aberration, or had conditions changed 
in the forestry market or due to pests or other economic factors such that a 
lower deforestation rate would have happened anyway?  Soon parties will be 
jockeying to adjust baselines and rate measurements to maximize the offset 
196. U4 ANTI CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTER, CORRUPTION AND REDD+ IDENTIFYING 
RISKS AMID COMPLEXITY 2-3 (2012), available at http://www.u4.no/publications/ 
corruption-and-redd-identifying-risks-amid-complexity/. 
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and obscure the proper baseline.  To make matters worse, the ARB will have 
to sort this out thousands of miles away. 
The problem is not merely theoretical, as the leading province for 
linkage is believed to be Acre, in Brazil.  Acre has a declining yearly 
deforestation rate and it will be below its 10-year average deforestation rate 
even if its doubles the rate of deforestation from 2011.197  If the rate were 
based upon a 3-year period, it could still merely maintain its rate of 
deforestation and get credits, though far fewer.  Even if the 10-year average 
is a rolling average, it would be well beyond 2020 before any offsets awarded 
would actually be additional. 
It would seem imperative if these reductions are to be additional to 
what is already occurring without AB 32 offsets that the baseline level be 
adjusted to capture the decline in deforestation rates over the last 10 years 
prior to the commencement of the linkage.  Otherwise, Acre will have no 
incentive to continue with its progress and real and verifiable emission 
reductions in California will be foregone with no additional benefit in Acre, 
or in similar circumstances, Chiapas. 
One suggested remedy for what would be a regulatory nightmare for a 
distant ARB is to rely upon third parties for regulatory oversight.  The REDD 
Offset Working Group (ROW), a group of state representatives and technical 
experts who are developing recommendations for California, Chiapas and 
Mexico for how to implement linkage, have included in their 
recommendations numerous references to the use of third parties for the 
most important tasks of assuring these offsets are real.  “California should 
recognize credits issued by Partner Jurisdictions or approved third-party 
programs that meet California’s requirements.”198  “California should rely on 
independent third-party certification and auditing of these programs rather 
than attempting to perform its own regulatory oversight.”199 
A third-party regulatory program, displacing the California Air 
Resources Board’s primary role under AB 32 as the chief implementer and 
regulator of the cap-and-trade program is not a trivial suggestion.  How are 
these third parties accountable?  How are conflicts of interest avoided? 
What is the role of the public in decisions made by third parties?  In a 
situation where corruption is commonplace and the methodological issues 
are not transparent and are easily gamed, the checks and balances available 
to U.S. governmental agencies to offset validation would seem to be 
essential. 
197. See ROW Recommendations, supra note 93, at 14, Figure 1.3.
198. Id. at 5.  See pages 7, 8, 24, 28, 30, 32, 46, and 58.
199. Id. at 58.
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VIII. Can Offsets Be Made Credible?
Regulatory programs have incorporated offsets for decades without the
issues presented in the ARB’s approach, and without the problems 
documented for the Kyoto CDM process.  Principally, the Federal Clean Air 
Act has relied upon offsets in its New Source Review Program.200 
The differences between the offsets provided in the federal Clean Air 
Act and the ARB’s approach are substantial.  Federal offsets are required for 
new major sources of pollution in areas failing to achieve health 
standards.201  The offsets must be enforceable and provide emission 
reductions that are otherwise not required.202  Under the federal Clean Air 
Act the offsets are approved on a project-by-project basis, either at the time 
they were banked or during the permit process for a new or modified source 
that seeks to use them.  “Offsets are emission reductions, generally obtained 
from existing sources located in the vicinity of a proposed source.”203  They 
are usually regulated sources,204 subject to inspections and monitoring, 
within the jurisdiction of an air pollution agency, to assure there is no fraud. 
There are numerous opportunities for public involvement.205  To the extent 
these sources are controlling beyond their permitted levels, there is at least 
some assurance that indeed the reductions are real.206 
The ARB’s offset program veers into unregulated areas and makes 
short-cut assumptions as to what would be a suitable baseline.  The 
advantage is that areas beyond its immediate regulatory authority may 
contribute to reducing global warming, hopefully at a cheaper price than 
reductions at industrial sources.  However, this regulatory scheme may lead 
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a), (c) (2012).
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2012).
202. Natural Res. Def. Council v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 651 F.3d
1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011). 
203. Nonattainment NSR Basic Information, UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/naa.html (last visited July 8, 2013). 
204. See Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 108-109 (2012). 
205. See What You Can Do, UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/NSR/public.html (last visited July 8, 2013). 
206. Admittedly, on the state level, states have used EPA’s approval of
Economic Incentive Programs to broaden traditional offsets to incorporate various 
trading schemes with traditionally unregulated activities.  To the extent states have 
done this, they face the same environmental justice issues as ARB’s AB 32 offsets. 
See Drury et al., supra note 29; see also Nicklas A. Akers, New Tools For Environmental 
Justice: Articulating A Net Health Effects Challenge To Emissions Trading Markets, 7 HASTINGS 
WEST NORTHWEST J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 203 (2001). 
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to errors in the performance standards for specific projects or activities, 
resulting in a substantial risk that some of the resulting reductions may not 
be real. 
If offsets are substantially unreal or not additional, it would mean that 
the promised emission reductions from cap-and-trade will not occur.  That 
would not necessarily doom the entire AB 32 program because, as discussed 
above, it is a small part of the entire program.  Even then, to the extent 
allowances are no longer passed out for free but must be purchased, carbon 
will have a price, though with cheap unreal offsets the price will inevitably 
be low.  At that point cap-and-trade is functionally like a carbon tax, and like 
all carbon taxes, if they are too low it will not significantly change polluter 
behavior.  At that point, the program will simply fund the government, who 
may be selling the allowances at auctions, and the offset developers, who 
may or may not be engaged in activity that is additional and beneficial. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the earlier part of this article, reducing 
cap-and-trade to essentially a tax that has no real effect on greenhouse 
gases will irretrievably discredit greenhouse gas regulation.  And to the 
extent it delays needed reductions with their health co-benefits, it raises 
profound environmental justice issues.  It is therefore crucial to get it right. 
The discussion above suggests that the ARB might have been wiser to 
limit its offset program for emission reductions from stationary sources 
already regulated under state and federal air pollution laws, albeit not 
included in the AB 32 cap.  Overcompliance would entitle a source to 
contribute an offset if it was permanent.  These sources could be easily 
monitored and documented. 
An alternative to a complete ban of nontraditional offsets that are from 
sources not regulated under state and federal air pollution laws is a far 
tougher limit on how many offsets could be purchased.  The ARB by 
regulation has allowed offsets to potentially overwhelm all of the reductions 
from cap-and-trade, as discussed above.  If nontraditional offsets were 
generally more limited, then the program as a whole would have credibility 
and these experimental offsets would be a true pilot program, at least 
through 2020.  It would give the agency time to develop its expertise and 
methodology without undue harm to the program.  If there are concerns 
about tighter offset limits leading to unduly high allowance costs, Professor 
Kaswan has suggested the ARB could increase the number of allowances 
available only to the extent needed to return to reasonable costs.207   
207. See Alice Kaswan, Comments on Supplemental Functional Equivalent Document,
in CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, RESPONSES TO COMMENTS ON THE SUPPLEMENT TO THE
AB 32 SCOPING PLAN FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT 46-9 (2011), available at http:// 
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/response_to_comments_on_supplement_to_fed.pdf.  
Professor Kaswan suggested in her comment limiting offsets to no more than 4%, 
rather than 8% of total emissions by 2020.  The ARB did not specifically respond to 
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Professor David E. Adelman has suggested still another proposal to 
assure that non-traditional offsets do not lead to toxic hot spots in 
industrialized neighborhoods.  He suggests identifying certain industrial 
facilities, such as steel mills, normally located in toxic hot spots and 
discounting the value of any offsets they purchase, or putting a premium on 
their price, and requiring enhanced monitoring.208  The advantage of this 
approach is that it does not bar offsets completely, allowing some flexibility 
and cost-control; however, it creates the problem of finding the sweet spot 
of the discount so that it is strong enough to limit offsets without curtailing 
them completely.  It would seem a firm limit on such offsets would be more 
reliable than guessing at the market effect of a premium. 
Even a well-regulated offset program from nonregulated sources has 
the potential to cause environmental justice issues as described above.  This 
problem could at least be mitigated by directing that some of the proceeds 
from an offset sale be directed towards the Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Fund, which based upon SB 535 (2012) has a portion targeted specifically to 
disadvantaged communities.209 
If the ARB wishes to explore the world of international forestry, it 
cannot assign out its governmental responsibilities to third parties.  It needs 
to do its own evaluation of the appropriate baseline and avoid the use of 
performance standards.  A sector approach for international offsets might be 
promising, but it needs to assess all of the circumstances including short 
term and long term trends and establish sufficient agreements to allow it to 
monitor and inspect as well as rely upon satellite data to understand 
whether a reduction in deforestation is really something new resulting from 
the prospect of being awarded an offset credit or just business as usual.210  
this suggestion, just noting in general that existing permits, regulatory controls, and 
enforcement actions makes adverse air pollution impacts “unlikely.”  Id. at 46-39.  The 
author suggests focusing in on the nontraditional and international offsets and more 
aggressively reducing them to perhaps 4% of the “emission reductions” anticipated in 
the Scoping Plan, truly a pilot program that will not swamp the anticipated program 
benefits.   
208. David E. Adelman, supra note 111.
209. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39711, 39715 (Deering 2013).  California
Governor Jerry Brown, however, has “loaned” the proceeds of this fund to the state’s 
general fund for non-Greenhouse Gas reduction uses, purportedly for one to two 
years, suggesting that this approach has its political limits.  See CALIFORNIA AIR 
RESOURCES BD., CAP-AND-TRADE AUCTION PROCEEDS INVESTMENT PLAN:  FISCAL YEARS 2013-
14 THROUGH 2015-2016 1 (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capand 
trade/auctionproceeds/final_investment_plan.pdf. 
210. California State Senator Ricardo Lara has proposed eliminating
international offsets entirely, in a bill that is supported by the Coalition for Clean Air 
and the State Building Trades Council of California and opposed by the California 
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By minimizing offsets from unregulated pollution sources, abandoning 
a generalized performance standard for a holistic case by case or sector by 
sector approach, refusing to farm out its responsibilities to third parties and 
mitigating environmental justice concerns, the ARB could salvage in 
principle its greenhouse gas offset program.  It could also hope that while 
there are theoretical flaws that could allow the program to be gamed, that 
for most offsets the performance standards will on average in practice end 
up identifying real offsets in most cases.  ARB seems to rely on the latter 
strategy.  It is effectively rolling the dice with odds only more likely than not 
that it will succeed—a little better than flipping a coin and calling heads. 
The test of whether the ARB’s pragmatic strategy will work will be in 
the actual data from the operation of AB 32.  Auction prices should rise as 
free allowances are phased out and the cap decreases.  If the prices do not 
rise, capped companies are possibly innovating and thereby reducing their 
emissions.  Alternatively, an oversupply of cheaper offsets may be available. 
If offsets are plentiful enough to fully meet the amount allowed under AB 32 
by 2020, then possibly, they are too easy to come by.  The selling price of 
offsets in the period after the market settles and companies become 
experienced with the program would also be a signal of the supply of offsets.  
The allowance auction price, the number of offsets being created and used 
and their price will be important data points to watch.211   
Still, the complete answer will require a careful audit of the offsets. 
Have rates of deforestation fundamentally changed in California and in 
developing countries linked to the program?  Are rates of destroyed 
refrigerants and farm biogas digesters increasing throughout the US even for 
those entities outside the program?  The answers to these questions and the 
relevant data points of the program will demonstrate whether the ARB has 
Chamber of Commerce.  See S.B 605, 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at 
http://leginfo. 
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml.  Also opposed by oil companies, 
offset developers and environmentalists backing cap-and-trade, business analysts 
confirmed the offset dependency of the California program arguing that without out-
of-state and international offsets the price of allowance credits could rise 200 
percent, in effect admitting that cap-and-trade will not produce any significant 
innovation reducing pollutants in capped industries.  Rory Carroll, California Offsets Bill 
to Allow Out-Of-State Credits, POINT CARBON (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.pointcarbon. 
com/news/1.2514699.   
211. A senior analyst at Thompson Reuters Point Carbon now predicts that
California carbon prices will be reduced by two-thirds from initial forecasts due to 
reduction of emissions from other AB 32 programs and the supply of allowances and 
offsets, an ominous sign.  Thomson Reuters Point Carbon lowers California carbon price forecast 
by two thirds, POINT CARBON (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/ 
pressroom/pressreleases/1.2562573. 
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been wise in its approach.  It will also determine who has won the offset 
game and who has lost. 
IX. Conclusion
Cap-and-trade’s initial promise was that two sources, under
obligations to comply with regulations, could choose the cheapest method 
of reducing emissions to meet an overall cap on emissions at the least cost 
via market mechanisms.  By trading its right to pollute created by reducing 
emissions, a source could monetize its innovation and, for a price, help 
another source avoid doing more expensive reductions.  California threatens 
to have a cap-and-offset program, instead of cap-and-trade, with offsets that 
may be illusory.  On paper it may achieve its goals of reducing emissions; 
but in reality, the system fails to reduce global emissions of greenhouse 
gases while assuring environmental justice for all of its residents.  
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*  *  *
